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I Comments I
Student Challenges to Academic Decisions:




U.S. courts have consistently held that college students may not sue
their institutions based on academic challenges. Academic challenges, to
be distinguished from disciplinary issues, are those that involve a
student's course work and acceptance into special academic programs.
Due to the judiciary's categorization of academic challenges as not
cognizable claims, students do not have a neutral third-party forum
where their rights can be adequately evaluated. Although courts have
stated that the judiciary is not the appropriate forum for academic claims
due to lack of expertise, among other issues, this Comment argues that
courts are an appropriate forum for the adjudication of certain academic
challenges. This Comment further argues that there is strong support for
judicial review of cases in the areas of contract formation, breach of
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contract, tort law, and personal liberties. Finally, this Comment presents
a series of questions that courts may ask when choosing whether to
adjudicate a student's legal claim against their institution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the value of a strong educational background in today's job
market,' students are becoming more likely to bring judicial challenges
to academic decisions if those academic decisions compromise their
chance of receiving their degrees. 2  While judicial deference to the
decisions of academic institutions is the proper standard in some
instances, 3 there are other instances when judicial scrutiny can add
valuable insight to the evaluation of a student's claim.
Student challenges of academic decisions usually focus on the
grades of important exams or the granting of a degree to the student.
These claims are, in many instances, grounded in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 Due Process claims in the academic
context usually concern fair procedures for students who are appealing
academic decisions.7 Claims are also commonly based on the First
Amendment,8 which the Supreme Court has used to establish a right to
academic freedom. 9 In reviewing these student claims, the Supreme
Court has regularly held that deference to the decisions of the academic
institution is proper because the decisions relate to an evaluative process
that is best used by professors and the administration. l However,
student challenges may concern contract claims, property issues, and
1. See Kent Hill et al., The Value of Higher Education: Individual and Societal
Benefits 11-16 (Oct. 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Productivity and
Prosperity Project at Arizona State University).
2. See Robert M. O'Neil, Judicial Deference to Academic Decisions: An Outmoded
Concept?, 36 J.C. & U.L. 729, 733 (2010) (discussing the rising trend of academic
challenges in the judiciary).
3. See id. at 732-35 (discussing the trend of judicial deference).
4. See Churchill v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 2010 Colo. App. LEXIS 1745, 1748
(Colo. App. 2010); Kashmiri v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 156 Cal. App. 4th 809, 812
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007); Ku v. State of Tenn., 322 F.3d 431, 440 (6th Cir. 2003).
5. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 217 (1985); Bd. of
Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 81 (1978); Sylvester v. Tex. Southern
Univ., 957 F. Supp. 944, 947 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
7. See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 217; Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 81.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. See Keyshian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 594
(1967); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 312 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 274 (1978) (discussing university's First Amendment right to
make autonomous decisions).
10. See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 79; Sylvester, 957 F. Supp. at 944.
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immunity standards; areas of law where courts can use their expertise to
lend valuable assistance to students and universities."
When examining judicial deference in cases involving higher
education institutions, one must differentiate between academic and
disciplinary issues. 12  College13 procedures for evaluating academic
performance do not necessarily follow a traditional judicial adversary
model. 14  The disciplinary processes on many college campuses, in
contrast, bear a striking resemblance to traditional judicial systems in the
United States.' 5  A "full hearing" requirement often attaches to
disciplinary matters, such as those concerning non-classroom related
conduct or alcohol issues.' 6 Evaluations of an academic nature are also
more subjective and fact specific than most disciplinary processes.17
Moreover, the Supreme Court has emphasized that "an expert evaluation
of cumulative [academic] information" is not the type of decision that the
Court is best equipped to make. '8 The experts that the Court referred to
are professors and academic administrators who are accustomed to
taking on the multi-faceted role that facilitates a personal relationship
between student and educator. 19 The educator's role in the lives of
students has historically made the academic evaluation process
inherently non-adversarial. 20  Therefore, according to the Court,
educators are best equipped to evaluate academic performance on all
necessary levels.
21
The Supreme Court, however, has gone beyond noting the
differences between the disciplinary process and the academic evaluation
22process. The Court has recognized that, in some instances, a formal
hearing that would be beneficial in the disciplinary context may actually
be harmful in the academic context. 23 While it is acceptable, and even
11. See Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 581 (1972); Churchill v.
Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 2010 Colo. App. LEXIS 1745, 1746 (Colo. App. 2010);
Kashmiri v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. 156 Cal. App. 4th 809, 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007);
Ku v. State of Tenn., 322 F.3d 431, 440 (6th Cir. 2003).
12. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 571.
13. The author uses the word "college" to refer generally to institutions of higher
education, including, but not limited to, colleges, community colleges, and universities.
14. See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 89.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 89-90 (stating that academic judgments are "by [their] nature more
subjective and evaluative than the typical factual questions presented in the average
disciplinary decision").
18. See id. at 90.
19. See id.
20. See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 90.
23. See id.
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expected, that the nature of disciplinary proceedings will ignite an
adversarial dynamic in the student-teacher relationship, the judiciary
finds it more troublesome to allow this adversarial nature to arise in
instances of academic concern. 24 The Court has acknowledged its own
reservations about expanding the judicial presence in higher education
issues for fear of "deteriorat[ing]" the student experience and faculty
authority. "
Because the Court has already stated that the judicial process is, in
26many ways, well suited to evaluate disciplinary decisions, this
Comment will focus solely on the academic challenges that colleges
face. This Comment will argue that, in some instances, the judicial
process is equally, if not better, suited to handle these challenges.27
While the process for disciplinary decisions at colleges has been attached
directly to the individual right to Due Process,28 the legal avenues
available to students in academic proceedings are not as clearly
established. 29 The judiciary cannot assume that, because professors and
administrators have a level of expert knowledge concerning academics,
they necessarily always act in a manner that reflects sound judgment.3 °
There is, indeed, merit in judicial deference to academic decisions made
in an obviously non-arbitrary manner; however, in some instances, courts
may be encouraging harm to students when they defer to universities
without further evaluation.
31
This Comment will proceed as follows. Part II will discuss and
outline the history of academic challenges in the judiciary.32 The cases
discussed will set forth the foundation that courts have developed in
deferring to the decisions of colleges in academic cases.33 This
Comment will also examine the less common areas of law that
occasionally relate to academic challenges.34  While courts have
24. See id.
25. See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90.
26. See Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 6 (8th Cir. 1975).
27. See infra Part 11I.
28. See Greenhill, 519 F.2d at 10.
29. See infra Part III.
30. See Atria v. Vanderbilt Univ., 142 F. App'x 246, 261 (6th Cir. 2005); Sylvester
v. Tex. Southern Univ., 957 F. Supp. 944, 947 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
31. See Atria, 142 F. App'x at 261.
32. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 145 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565 (1968); Scallet v.
Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1011 (W.D. Va. 1996).
33. See Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 530 (1819).
34. See Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); Ku v. State
of Tenn., 322 F.3d 431, 446 (6th Cir. 2003); Churchill v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 2010
Colo. App. LEXIS 1745, 1749 (Colo. App. 2010); Kashmiri v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
156 Cal. App. 4th 809, 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); see also infra Part III.
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frequently focused on constitutional law issues, students may further
ground their claims against universities and colleges in contract
formation,35 breach of contract,36 tort law,37 and personal liberty and
property interests. 38 Part III will then articulate a number of factors that
courts should consider when presented with student challenges to
academic decisions. These considerations will allow the judiciary to
undertake a more proactive role, where appropriate, without fear of
inconsistency. 39 This Comment concludes by suggesting that the legal
area of student academic challenges would greatly benefit from
reevaluation. Through an analysis of the case law that can be applied to
student challenges of academic decisions, the judiciary could better
determine when deference to institutional decisions is appropriate and
when judicial intervention would be most beneficial.
II. BACKGROUND
Perhaps the most seminal case exploring the interplay between the
judiciary and higher education institutions is Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward.40  The case involved a dispute between the
Trustees and President of Dartmouth College concerning the charter of
41
Dartmouth and its status as a private institution. In its decision, the
Supreme Court deferred to the college and its perspective, upholding the
sanctity of the original charter of the college that pre-dated the creation
of the state.42 The Supreme Court used this conflict to establish a zone
of immunity for academic institutions and their decisions and actions.43
Since Woodward, courts have consistently deferred to colleges on
their decisions concerning academic challenges and issues. 44 As Justice
35. See Russell v. Salve Regina Coll., 890 F.2d 484,493 (1st Cir. 1989); Demasse v.
ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1151 (Ariz. 1999); Woolley v. Hoffinann-La Roche, Inc., 491
A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. 1985); Davis v. George Mason Univ., 395 F. Supp. 2d 331, 340
(E.D. Va. 2005).
36. See Sharick v. Southeastern Univ. of Health Sci., 780 So. 2d 136, 142 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2000).
37. See Atria v. Vanderbilt Univ., 142 F. App'x 246, 263 (6th Cir. 2005); Doe v.
Yale Univ., 748 A.2d 834, 854 (Conn. 2000); Ross v. Saint Augustine Coll., 103 F.3d
338, 342 (4th Cir. 1996).
38. See Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 (1978); Bishop
v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 352 (1976); Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
583 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972).
39. See Keyshian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967) (citing Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985)).
40. Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
41. See id. at 518-21.
42. See id. at 539.
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985);
Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 9 (8th Cir. 1975) ("It is true that courts will ordinarily
2013]
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Byron White explained in Moore v. East Cleveland,45 courts must defer
to decisions made by other tribunals unless there is an egregious instance
46of arbitrariness. Historically, courts have treated academic institutions
as a tribunal and deferred to the institutions when dealing with academic
challenges.4 7 However, this "hands-off' policy does not apply when an
educational institution deprives a student of a fundamental personal
liberty or compromises a significant interest.4a  In instances of
constitutional concern, courts will examine the decision of the college to
ensure that students' constitutional rights have not been infringed.49 In
these instances, courts have also examined the legal protections that
should be afforded to students. 50
A. Judicial Deference and Due Process
Regularly, courts entertain Due Process challenges to academic
decisions. 5 Students who are dissatisfied with an important academic
decision often claim that they did not receive a proper hearing and that
their school did not give them an adequate and fair opportunity to present
their side of the issue. 52 In Regents of the University of Michigan v.
Ewing,53 Ewing was a student in a joint undergraduate and medical
degree program at the University of Michigan. 54 When Ewing failed a
required examination, a university review board unanimously dismissed
him from the program.55 Ewing challenged the university's decision in
federal court on grounds of promissory estoppel and Due Process.
56
After a federal trial court in Michigan rejected both of Ewing's claims,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in Ewing's
favor, holding that a student has a constitutionally protected right to
continued enrollment in an academic program.57 However, on appeal,
the Supreme Court held that, where a university engages in regular
evaluations of a student's academic status and exercises professional
defer to the broad discretion bested in school officials and will rarely review an education
institution's evaluation of the academic performance of its students.").
45. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
46. See id. at 543-44.




51. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 227 (1985); Bd. of
Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 79 (1978).
52. See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 227.
53. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
54. Seeid. at215.
55. Seeid. at 216.
56. See id. at 217.
57. See id. at 222.
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judgment in a fair and impartial manner, the Court has no authority to
overturn an academic decision. 58 Therefore, while a student does have a
right to continued enrollment, such a right is not unlimited. 59
The Supreme Court based its decision in Ewing on the reasoning
articulated in Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v.
Horowitz. 60 In Horowitz, the Court deferred to the professional academic
judgment of the university when a student challenged her dismissal from
medical school.61 The University of Missouri dismissed Horowitz in her
final year of the program because she failed to meet the program's
standards.62 Horowitz asserted a deprivation of Due Process claim
against the University of Missouri and contended that her dismissal
proceedings were fundamentally unfair.6 3 The Court rejected her
argument and noted that, not only was Horowitz afforded full disclosure
concerning the nature of her dismissal, she was also allowed multiple
opportunities to appeal and present her case to various authorities.64
Based on these findings, the Court held that the University of Missouri
had provided sufficient Due Process, and, therefore, deference to the
decision of the University was warranted.65
The Horowitz Court strongly emphasized that the decisions made by
universities and their faculty are of a special nature.66 Moreover, the
Supreme Court noted that courts are "ill-equipped" in making decisions
concerning academic performance or even in adequately evaluating
decisions of an academic nature. 67 Furthermore, the Court in Horowitz
emphasized that colleges, in order to function as self-determining
institutions of higher learning, require a basic level of discretion in
judging academic merits of their students' qualifications.68
B. Judicial Deference and Academic Freedom
In Keyshian v. Board of Regents,69 the Supreme Court further
expressed concern about the judiciary infringing on the academic
58. See id. at 227-28.
59. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 227-28.
60. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1977).
61. Seeid. at 79.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 82.
64. See id. at 85.
65. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 91.
66. See id. at 89-90 (noting that academic decisions warrant "an expert evaluation of
cumulative information and [are] not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or
administrative decision making.").
67. See id. at 92.
68. See id. at 96.
69. Keyshian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
2013]
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institution's right of academic freedom .70 The Supreme Court has
developed the concept of academic freedom as part of First Amendment
jurisprudence and has since closely guarded this freedom. 71 Academic
freedom is the constitutional doctrine of autonomy for educational
institutions.7a
The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of academic
freedom by stating that this freedom not only allows for a free flow of
ideas in the classroom and research setting but also protects universities
and colleges from the potentially overbearing influence of the public.73
While professors and higher education administrators can still be held
responsible for their actions, academic freedom affords a heightened
level of First Amendment protection and allows for some leeway when
unpopular or controversial decisions need to be made.74 The Court in
Keyshian acknowledged the state's interest in protecting its educational
system but noted that the interests of the state cannot be held as
paramount to the interests of academic freedom. 75 The State's actions
must be limited to the narrowest scope possible to preserve fundamental
personal liberties.76 Because academic freedom is a fundamental
constitutional right,77 restrictions on it are subject to strict judicial
scrutiny. 78
The Supreme Court further noted that academic freedom, as a
personal liberty, is a concern for all people that our nation is committed
to safeguarding as an essential aspect of the American college
70. See id. at 603.
71. See Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First





75. See Keyshian, 385 U.S. at 602.
76. See id. at 602 ("[E]ven though the governmental purpose may be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.").
77. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (introduced the
idea that fundamental rights are examined under various levels of scrutiny).
78. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (1938); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). The Supreme
Court has developed various levels of scrutiny when analyzing some types of
constitutional questions, the highest of which is strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny was first
applied in 1994 to racial categorizations when the Court made a determination
concerning Japanese-American internments during WWII. Strict scrutiny is a three-level
test that begins with an examination of whether a fundamental constitutional right is at
risk. If a fundamental right is at risk, there must be sufficient justification for the
government's infringement on that right, meaning that the government must demonstrate
that the infringement is both narrowly tailored and necessary to a compelling
governmental interest.
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community.79 In Grutter v. Bollinger,8 ° the Court acknowledged that
certain determinations promote a school's interest in autonomy and are
expressly protected by the First Amendment. 81 Although the judiciary
has a strongly rooted historical tendency to defer to academic institutions
when dealing with academic challenges, this "hands-off' policy can be
superseded when an institution acts to either deprive a student of a
fundamental personal liberty or threaten a significant academic interest.
82
In fact, the Court has held that a student's fundamental rights are more
valuable than some interests of the state and higher education
institutions, and it is vital that the judiciary protect these fundamental
rights.83
Due to the importance of academic freedom, the Supreme Court has
expressed concern about the lack of a clear standard on which to operate
84 Corwhen evaluating academic decisions. The Court noted any action
without a clear, underlying standard would unquestionably compromise
academic freedom in the United States, which the Court termed a
"special concern of the First Amendment." 85 The Court summarized its
position on academic freedom and judicial review by stating that
"precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely
touching our most precious freedoms. 86
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS BEYOND DEFERENCE
As noted above, courts generally defer to academic decisions of
institutions unless the decision in question is arbitrary and capricious.
87
Courts have repeatedly refused to become involved in an evaluation of
academic performance. 88 However, the judiciary has explicitly stated
that not all considerations of academic performance and evaluation are
beyond the scope of judicial review.89 Courts traditionally view
challenges to academic decisions as based in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment or the First Amendment.9" Accordingly,
regulations that appear reasonable on their face may not necessarily
preclude a court from examining an action by a college to determine
79. See Keyshian, 385 U.S. at 603.
80. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003).
81. See id.
82. See Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 6 (8th Cir. 1975).
83. See id.
84. See Keyshian, 385 U.S. at 603.
85. See id.
86. See id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963)).
87. See In re Susan M. v. N.Y. Law Sch., 556 N.E.2d 1104,1107 (N.Y. 1990).
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
2013]
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whether the action was arbitrary. 91  The issues involved in many
academic challenges are not substantially different from those in other
cases which courts adjudicate on a regular basis. 92 Therefore, courts
should not necessarily defer to institutions based on the notion that they
are not well suited for evaluating academic decisions.
93
In many instances, the college may not be an "expert" in terms of
making determinations that impact a student's academic future. 94 An
academic institution may be clouded by its own interests and therefore
have a difficult time considering the impact that its decision will have on
the student.
95
In Atria v. Vanderbilt University,96 for example, a medical student
sued his university after being found guilty of cheating on an exam and
subsequently suspended from the upcoming summer session. 97  The
student alleged that his professor had unfairly redistributed the exams
and, as a result, exposed him to the risk of his exam being altered. 98 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a jury could
reasonably conclude that the professor's methods put the student at a
higher risk of being charged with an honor code violation. 99 While the
university had argued on behalf of its tenured professor for summary
judgment, the court found that the harm suffered by the student as a
result of the academic sanctions was much more severe than the
university acknowledged, thus warranting judicial examination. 100 The
university chose to favor its professor unfairly and, thus, did not follow
the rules set forth by its Honor Council. 10 1 Moreover, the university had
risked the student's academic future and record to preserve its own
interests. 102
Cases like Atria demonstrate that deference to the institution may
not be appropriate in certain instances. 103 Inevitably, an academic
institution has a stake in the outcome of academic decisions and,
91. See id.
92. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972); Atria v. Vanderbilt Univ.,
142 F. App'x 246, 248 (6th Cir. 2005).
93. See Ross v. Saint Augustine Coll., 103 F.3d 338, 341 (4th Cir. 1996); Woolley v.
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. 1985).
94. See Sylvester v. Tex. Southern Univ., 957 F. Supp. 944, 953 (S.D. Tex. 1997);
Atria, 142 F. App'x at 247.
95. See Atria, 142 F. App'x at 249.
96. Atria v. Vanderbilt Univ., 142 F. App'x 246 (6th Cir. 2005).
97. See id. at 249.
98. Seeid. at251.
99. See id. at 253.
100. See id. at 254.
101. See id.
102. Atria, 142 F. App'x at 252.
103. See Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978).
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therefore, university employees may not be truly impartial evaluators.'04
Due to potential biases, courts should not be so tentative in assuming the
role of academic evaluator. 105
The Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of the court as an
academic decision maker in Cannon v. University of Chicago.10 6 The
parties had raised the issue of whether the threat of litigation would have
a negative impact on institutions of higher education. 10 7 The Court in
Cannon dispelled the idea that litigation concerning academic decisions
would be overly burdensome or harmful to a college.1"8 The Court
explained that the legal system has a great impact on society as it
progresses. 10 9  Throughout history, there has not been an area of
litigation too costly for the court system to handle, thus negating any
claims that allowing some academic challenges into the court system
would be overly burdensome. 110
To move beyond their reservations about interfering in academia,
courts need guidance in evaluating those academic claims that come
before them.' From the various cases that courts have chosen to
evaluate despite their academic nature, one can recognize several helpful
questions that the judiciary should consider before deciding whether to
evaluate the merits of a case. These questions include:
" Does the case involve an intricacy of law that requires
judicial expertise? 112
* Does the case present an inherent bias for the college?"
13
* Is the basis for litigation highly controversial?
114
* Would the case benefit from examination by a jury?
115
* Does the case involve a fundamental interest that the
judiciary is designed to protect?"
16
In the following sections, 117 this Comment will discuss areas of law that,
when applied to academic decisions, produce the above criteria that
104. See Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 822 (6th Cir. 1989).
105. See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 91.
106. Canon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
107. See id. at 709-10.
108. See id. at 709.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978).
112. See infra Part III.A.
113. See infra Part III.B.
114. See infra Part III.C.
115. See infra Part III.D.
116. See infra Part III.E.
117. See infra Parts III.A-E.
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courts should consider when determining whether to defer to the
academic institution's judgment. This Comment will conclude by noting
the merits of these questions and by discussing why courts should
consider them in order to protect students' rights while still affording a
level of academic autonomy to colleges.
A. Formation of Contract
The judiciary has long dealt with issues involving contracts between
parties. 18 Notably, in the academic context, courts have stated that the
relationship between an academic institution and its students is a
contractual one. 119  However, the judiciary does not rigidly apply
contract law to academic challenges.1 20  The court system is specially
equipped with the knowledge and experience necessary to handle the
intricacies of contract law as it applies to the relationship between a
student and college. 1
21
Courts often rely on case law that interprets employment contracts
when analyzing contracts between students and universities. 122  A
contract that forms between a college and a student is typically
characterized as implied-in-fact.123  Absent a disclaimer, the implied
contract made by a college in its brochures, website publications, and
other printed materials is an enforceable contract that a student may
reasonably rely on. 124  Similar to the employee and employer in an
employment relationship, students and universities rely on the actions of
others and have important expectations based on that reliance.'25
118. See Lyons v. Salve Regina Coll., 565 F.2d 200, 206 (1st Cir. 1977); see also
Harwood v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 747 A.2d 205, 209 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); Alden
v. Georgetown Univ., 743 A.2d 110, 111 n.ll (D.C. 1999).
119. See Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1267 (N.J. 1985).
120. See Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 644 (10th Cir. 1975);
Clayton v. Tr. of Princeton Univ., 608 F. Supp. 413, 418 (D.N.J. 1985).
121. See Russell v. Salve Regina Coll., 890 F.2d 484, 490 (1st Cir. 1989); Davis v.
George Mason Univ., 395 F. Supp. 2d 331, 357 (E.D. Va. 2005).
122. See Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1267; Russell, 890 F.2d at 490.
123. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923) (As
defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, "[An agreement 'implied in fact' . . . [is] ...
founded upon a meeting of minds, which, although not embodied in an express contract,
is inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the surrounding
circumstances, their tacit understanding."); see also Sharick v. Southeastern Univ. of
Health Sci., 780 So. 2d 136, 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
124. See Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1264; Russell, 890 F.2d at 488; see also Swartley v.
Hoffner, 734 A.2d 915, 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (citing Merrow v. Goldberg, 672 F.
Supp. 766, 774 (D.Vt. 1987)) ("The contract between [a college] and a student is
comprised of the written guidelines, policies, and procedures as contained in the written
materials distributed to the student over the course of their enrollment in the
institution.").
125. See Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1264; Sharick, 780 So. 2d at 139.
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Modifications to the college-student contract are held to the standards of
common contract law, meaning that continued performance by a student
does not constitute assent to any changes proposed or made by the
college. 
126
In Russell v. Salve Regina College,127 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit applied contract law to a student's relationship with her
nursing institution. 128 The court emphasized its role as an expert in
contract law and as the proper tribunal for evaluations of the intricacies
of contracts. 29 With this emphasis, the court denounced the college's
claim that it was in a "unique" position and was solely able to evaluate
Russell's claims. 130 While not previously considered by the academic
evaluators, the court then applied the doctrine of substantial performance
and ruled in Russell's favor, noting that the student's position was not
properly considered by the college during its decision making process. 
31
In another example, Davis v. George Mason University,'32 the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the university
had made an "unenforceable illusory contract" between itself and the
plaintiff student. 133 The university was unable to effectively articulate to
Davis why absolute mutuality did not bind their course listing guide. 
134
As a result, the court stepped in and noted that George Mason had merely
purported to promise a specific performance while, in reality, the
performance was entirely optional. 135  The case illustrates that the
judiciary also plays the important role of informing the academic
community of proper legal standards. 1
36
These cases exemplify the judiciary analyzing a specific area of law
as it pertains to the college-student relationship. Accordingly, courts
should first consider the following when making a determination as to
whether to hear a case or defer to the academic institution: does the case
involve an intricacy of law that requires judicial expertise?
Due to the complicated nature of contract formation, especially
between a college and student, contract formation is an area that may
require judicial expertise for interpretation.' 37  Universities are
126. See Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1142 (Ariz. 1999).
127. See Russell, 890 F.2d at 484.
128. See id. at 488.
129. See id. at 489.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Davis v. George Mason Univ., 395 F. Supp. 2d 331 (E.D. Va. 2005).




137. See Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 636 (10th Cir. 1975);
Clayton v. Tr. of Princeton Univ., 608 F. Supp. 413, 417 (D.N.J. 1985).
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undoubtedly best suited to make determinations of a clearly academic
nature and have the right to do so as part of their entitlement to academic
freedom. 138  However, when academic determinations become
intertwined with areas of law that require judicial expertise for
interpretation, courts should not hesitate to intervene. Judicial
intervention would preserve the sanctity of the relationship between the
college and student and would preserve consistency within the area of
law. Courts have been developing precedent and proper procedure
throughout their history, and they should not hesitate to assert themselves
as the best tribunal in some contexts and utilize the standards that they
have previously set forth to interpret the law as it applies to students.
B. Breach of Contract Claims
Beyond simply being the proper tribunal to evaluate the details of
academic contracts, courts are also better suited to evaluate damages
when the academic contract is breached. 139  Because of the obvious
interests that a college holds in any suit against it, most academic
institutions are likely to overlook many of the more abstract damages
concepts that may be applicable to students' claims. 140
In Sharick v. Southeastern University of the Health Sciences, Inc., 1
41
for example, the Third District Court of Appeals in Florida evaluated the
damages awarded to a student based on his breach of implied-in-fact
contract claim.142 The purpose of awarding damages when a contract is
breached is an attempt to place the injured party in the position they were
in before the breach of contract took place. 143 In this case, the university
believed that only reimbursement of tuition was appropriate, but the
court found that there was cause to consider the possibility of lost future
earnings and damage to professional reputation resulting from Sharick's
inability to enroll in a suitable program.' 44 While the university was
unable, or unwilling, to consider the possibility of damages beyond that
of tuition, the court used its contract law expertise to shed new light on
the academic issue. 1
45
138. See Keyshian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 601
(1967).
139. See Sharick v. Southeastern Univ. of Health Sci., 780 So. 2d 136, 147 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2000).
140. See id. at 140.
141. Sharick v. Southeastern Univ. of Health Sci., 780 So. 2d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000).
142. Seeid. at 138.
143. See 17 FLA. JuR. 2DDAMAGES § 18 (1997).
144. See 780 So. 2d at 140.
145. See Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24, 28 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(quoting C. McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES § 27, at 10 1-02 (1935)).
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Generally, courts are in the best position to evaluate when the
college or the student has breached the contract between them., 46 This
notion leads to the second consideration that courts should make when
determining whether to defer an academic decision: does the case present
an inherent bias for the college?
When a student states a contract claim against his or her college
concerning an academic decision, the institution immediately takes a
defensive position. Inevitably, this defensive position places the college
in a position of bias in favor of its own interests. While the college and
the student have a complex and intricate relationship, 147 the institution
also has its own interests that it will seek to protect. While seeking to
protect its interests, a college may overlook and ignore the needs of a
student.148 The judiciary is the proper tribunal to address this bias, serve
as a neutral third party, and provide a forum where the interests of both
the academic institution and the student can be met and preserved.
C. Tort Law: Retaliation and Emotional Distress
The judiciary is also the proper tribunal to evaluate student tort
claims against their college. 149 In Ross v. Saint Augustine's College,
50
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined retaliation
claims made by a student against her college. 151 Ross, a senior with an
impeccable academic record, testified in a reverse discrimination case
against Saint Augustine University; afterwards, she experienced severe
emotional distress when her grades and other accomplishments were
drastically minimized. 152 In cases concerning the torts of retaliation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, witness testimony is
paramount. 53 In Ross, the court evaluated claims by the university that
146. See Russell v. Salve Regina Coll., 890 F.2d 484, 489 (1st Cir. 1989); Davis v.
George Mason Univ, 395 F. Supp. 2d 331, 337 (E.D. Va. 2005); see also Johnson v.
Schmitz, 119 F. Supp. 2d 90, 94 (D. Conn. 2000); Bittle v. Okla. City Univ., 6 P.3d 509,
515 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000); Swartley v. Hoffner, 734 A.2d 915, 920 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999).
147. See Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 624 (10th Cir. 1975);
Clayton v. Tr. of Princeton Univ., 608 F. Supp. 413, 422 (D.N.J. 1985).
148. See Sylvester v. Tex Southern Univ., 957 F. Supp. 944, 956 (S.D. Tex. 1997); In
re Susan M. v. N.Y. Law Sch., 556 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (N.Y. 1990).
149. See Atria v. Vanderbilt Univ., 142 F. App'x 246, 255 (6th Cir. 2005); Ross v. St.
Augustine Coll., 103 F.3d 338, 349 (4th Cir. 1996); Doe v. Yale Univ., 748 A.2d 834,
847 (Conn. 2000).
150. Ross v. Saint Augustine's Coll., 103 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 1996).
151. See id.
152. Seeid. at 339.
153. See Crawford v. Wash., 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004); Shoucair v. Brown Univ., 917
A.2d 418, 423 (R.I. 2007).
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Ross was exaggerating the effects of the university's actions. 154 While
the university claimed that Ross had been unfairly favored and should
not have been allowed to bring her challenge to court, the Fourth Circuit
found that Ross had indeed suffered when Saint Augustine retaliated
against her. 55 The court further noted that St. Augustine demonstrated
reckless indifference toward Ross and violated the special legal
relationship that had formed between the two parties. 1
56
The judicial evaluation in Ross is a prime example of an instance
where a college is not able to properly evaluate and interpret the interests
of its student because of the level of controversy at issue in the
litigation. 157 In cases such as Ross, when the court makes determinations
concerning the adequacy of witness testimony and the potential for the
jury to make a reasonable determination concerning the amount of harm
suffered by the injured party, the judiciary is qualified to make
determinations about tort liability.'58 Furthermore, because of the
personal nature of tort law, 159 courts are most likely the only tribunal that
can competently evaluate liability.' 60 This personal nature is what leads
to the third consideration that courts should consider when determining
whether to accept an academic challenge: is the basis for litigation
highly controversial?
Although litigation always involves a conflict, some cases are more
impassionate than others. Where the injury to a student or the claim
against a college extends beyond simple determinations of academic
performance, further review may be necessary to provide adequate
outside perspective and to avoid emotion-based decisions.
Cases with sensitive issues at their core often turn on witness
testimony, which is best evaluated by a court of law. 16 1 Furthermore,
cases involving controversial subject matter and the college-student
relationship will likely require testimony from both college
administrators and students. Controversial cases necessitate some type
of judicial intervention to maintain and properly evaluate the issue.
While courts have attempted to avoid creating an adversarial relationship
154. See 103 F.3d at 441.




159. Tort law addresses harm to a plaintiff, examining the elements of a prima facie
case for physical or emotional harm as well as apportioning liability and defining
concepts such as intent, damages, and risk. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM (2010).
160. See Ross, 103 F.3d at 441.
161. See Crawford v. Wash., 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004); Shoucair v. Brown Univ., 917
A.2d 418, 423 (R.I. 2007).
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between the college and student when the issue is academic,
162
oppositional characteristics are unavoidable in some instances, thereby
making a judicial presence appropriate.
D. Tort Law: Negligence
Negligence is another area of tort law that students commonly use
to challenge the academic treatment they receive from their college. 
163
When examining negligence in the academic environment, these claims
must be distinguished from those of educational malpractice, which the
majority of courts have held is not a cognizable claim. 164 Claims of
educational malpractice are based on allegations by a plaintiff that the
educational services that he or she received from his or her college were
not adequate. 165 In contrast, negligence claims 166 are based on the idea
that the college or its actors conducted the class or the educational
program in a way that proximately caused injury to the plaintiff
student.167 Claims of negligence in an educational setting can still be
grounded, in part, on educational inadequacy as long as the result of the
inadequacy is some recognized type of actual harm, not just an
inadequate education in general. 68  Most courts are unwilling to
recognize general claims of inadequate education because no viable
claim exists for a legal duty as a matter of public policy. 169 Although the
distinction' 7" between educational malpractice claims and negligence
claims in the educational setting may be slight, this distinction is a prime
162. See Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978).
163. See Atria v. Vanderbilt Univ., 142 F. App'x 246, 271 (6th Cir. 2005); Doe v.
Yale Univ., 748 A.2d 834, 854 (Conn. 2000).
164. See Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1992).
165. See Hutchings v. Vanderbilt Univ., 55 F. App'x 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003)
(unpublished) (citing Ross, 957 F.2d at 414).
166. When claiming negligence on the part of his or her university, a student must
make out the prima facie case for negligence by proving (1) that a duty of care was owed
by the university to the student, (2) there was a breach of that duty, (3) an injury
occurred, and (4) the university was the proximate legal causation of that injury. See
Atria, 142 F. App'x at 251 (citing Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437,446 (Tenn. 1996)).
167. See Atria, 142 F. App'x at 251.
168. See Doe, 748 A.2d at 849; Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 687 A.2d 834, 845
(Conn. 1996).
169. See Doe, 748 A.2d at 849.
170. "The distinction lies in the duty that is alleged to have been breached. If the duty
alleged to have been breached is the duty to educate effectively, the claim is not
cognizable. If the duty alleged to have been breached is the common-law duty not to
cause [harm] by negligent conduct, such a claim is, of course, cognizable." Doe, 748
A.2d at 846 (citing Gupta, 687 A.2d at 845; Kirchner v. Yale Univ., 192 A.2d 641, 646
(Conn. 1963)).
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illustration of the fine line that the judiciary walks when examining
challenges to academic decisions. 
171
Courts have been reluctant to entertain negligence claims by
students because of various difficulties in determining the appropriate
standard of care for professors, administrators, and universities in general
when it comes to academic concerns. 172 However, even when the court
finds it difficult to establish a "precise criteria" to evaluate a defendant's
actions, they have held that a defendant still owes a duty of care. 173 A
college and its agents owe everyone-students included-a duty 17 4 to
avoid conduct that would pose an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of
harm. 175  A court will find a risk unreasonable when the foreseeable
probability and severity of harm posed by the defendant's conduct
outweighs any burden on the defendant that engaging in alterative, harm
avoiding, conduct would have created. 1
76
Cases like Atria illustrate the important role of the judiciary in
academic challenges where interpretation of the facts is vital to the
outcome. 177 In Atria v. Vanderbilt University,'78 a student based his
claim against his university in negligence, asserting that the manner in
which his professor returned exams had left him and other students
vulnerable to serious consequences at the hands of Vanderbilt's Honor
Council. 179  The court found that the record supported that Atria's
professor was aware of the risks posed by his exam redistribution system
and had actually taken measures to combat these risks, although the
methods he chose were not nearly sufficient to offset the level of harm
that the students were exposed to. '
80
The need for a detailed and unbiased interpretation of the facts leads
to the fourth question that courts should consider when deciding whether
to defer in cases of academic challenges: would the case benefit from
examination by a jury?
While academic institutions may have tribunals established to
examine the issues that their students present, these tribunals likely do
not deliver the same level of due process as that provided by a jury
171. See Atria, 142 F. App'x at 251; Doe, 748 A.2d. at 846.
172. See Atria, 142 F. App'x at 251.
173. See Stehn v. Bernarr Macfadden Found., Inc., 434 F.2d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 1970).
174. See Burroughs v. Magee, 118 S.W.3d 323, 329 (Tenn. 2003) ("Duty is the legal
obligation that a defendant owes a plaintiff to conform to a reasonable person standard of
care in order to protect against unreasonable risks.").
175. SeeAtria, 142 F. App'x at 251.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. Atria v. Vanderbilt Univ., 142 F. App'x 246 (6th Cir. 2005).
179. See id. at 250.
180. See id.
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decision. 181 Students do not lose their fundamental rights when they
enter an academic environment. 182 Therefore, when a student presents a
case that would greatly benefit from a jury trial-even if the basis for
litigation is academic in nature-the court system should provide one.
E. Personal Liberty and Property Interests
Personal liberty and property interests in non-tangible assets are
often considered simultaneously by courts. 183 When examining personal
liberty and property interests, courts are interpreting individual
constitutional rights 184 and making determinations about the required
extent of procedural Due Process.1 85 The Supreme Court has held that
procedural Due Process protects property interests beyond actual
ownership of real property 186 and has required protection from a broad
range of personal liberty deprivations. 187
In tenure disputes, the Supreme Court has held that an individual
does not have a property interest in his potential tenure position with a
college. 188 While it is possible for a court to find that a student seeking a
degree is analogous to a professor seeking tenure, it is more likely that a
court would find that the student is gaining ownership of his or her
education by paying for it. 189 In the past, courts have held that a student
is purchasing his or her education from a college.' 90 Through that
purchase, the student has a legitimate property interest in completing an
181. See id.
182. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,506 (1969).
183. See Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 83 (1978);
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 360 (1976); Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 604 (1972); Beitzell v. Jeffrey,
643 F.2d 870, 876 (1st Cir. 1981); Trimble v. W. Va. Bd. of Dir., 549 S.E.2d 294, 301
(W. Va. 2001).
184. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 568.
185. See Trimble, 549 S.E.2d at 302. Courts consider three factors when determining
the extent of procedural due process necessary: (1) the private interest that will be
affected by the official action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of a property interest
through the procedures used along with the probable value of additional or substitute
safeguards, and (3) the government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the requirements would entail. Id.
186. See, e.g., Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
187. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) ("Although the Court has not
assumed to define 'liberty' . . . with any great precision, that term is not confined to mere
freedom from bodily restraint.").
188. See Beitzell, 643 F.2d at 870.
189. See Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89 (1978); Dixon
v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 161 (5th Cir. 1961); Prairie View A&M Univ.
v. Mitchell, 27 S.W.3d 323, 325 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
190. See Dixon, 294 F.2d at 153.
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academic program. 191 Where a college attempts to rescind the final
product of the purchase agreement between the student and the
institution, the judiciary should intervene. 1
92
A student, through his or her time at an academic institution, gains
more than an abstract need or desire for his or her degree and more than
a unilateral expectation of it. 193 Instead, a student has a legitimate claim
of entitlement to receipt of his or her degree upon satisfactory
completion of the academic program.' 94  If the level of satisfaction
concerning a student's work is in question, an outside review is needed
to protect the student's investment. 1
95
Where personal liberty interests are concerned, courts examine
whether the actions of an institution compromise the personal interest
that a person has in his good name, which in turn translates into his
standing and associations within the educational and professional
community.' 96  When determining whether an institutional action
compromises personal liberty interests, courts examine factors such as
whether a plaintiff was accused of dishonesty or immorality and whether
his or her honor or integrity was at stake. 197 If an institution's actions
may foreclose an individual's chance to take advantage of or pursue
professional or academic opportunities, courts have held that the student
is entitled to a heightened level of judicial review beyond mere deference
to the college tribunal. 1
98
Students are entitled to basic rights that courts cannot ignore' 99 even
when an issue arises in an academic setting concerning an academic
decision. Preservation of basic liberties should be at the forefront when
courts consider the fifth and final question concerning whether to defer
or hear an academic challenge: does the case involve a fundamental
interest that the judiciary is meant to protect?
Primarily, the judiciary is the branch of government meant to
interpret the law to ensure that basic rights and freedoms are not lost.
200
Universities and other academic institutions are not qualified nor vested
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
194. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Dixon, 294 F.2d at 154.
195. See Dixon, 294 F.2d at 154.
196. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.
197. See id.
198. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 574; Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 237
(1957).
199. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional right . . . at the
schoolhouse gate.").
200. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 164 (1803) (establishing the
power of judicial review).
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with the power to make determinations concerning the fundamental
rights to which their students are entitled. Thus, when the judiciary
makes determinations concerning the fundamental academic liberties of
students, courts must also interpret those rights and adjudicate academic
decisions that may challenge or threaten those rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
Precedent establishes a predisposition for courts to defer to the
academic decisions of institutions. 2° !  Although this deference is
appropriate in certain instances, 2 it may be harmful to students in
others. In deferring to colleges on all academic decisions, the judiciary is
also disregarding its role as a legal evaluator.20 3
By expanding judicial examination of academic decisions beyond
constitutional law to areas of contract law, tort law, and property law,
courts would take a more active role in higher education. Such an
approach would be desirable in setting clearer standards for evaluating
academic decisions. Indeed, there are nuances and interpretations in the
law that only a court is suited to make.
20 4 The standard questions 2
°5
proposed in this Comment would allow courts to put aside their
reservations about involvement in academic decisions by clarifying a
standard for when deferring to educational institutions is appropriate.
To address the needs of higher education institutions and students,
courts should take a more proactive role in the reevaluation of certain
academic decisions. Doing so would not overstep the bounds of
academic freedom or expand the role of the judiciary and instead would
allow courts to engage in the type of evaluation for which they are best
suited.
201. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 217 (1985); Bd. of
Curators of Univ. ofMo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 81 (1978).
202. See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 86.
203. See Sylvester v. Tex. Southern Univ., 957 F. Supp. 944, 961 (S.D. Tex. 1997);
Atria v. Vanderbilt Univ., 142 F. App'x 246,253 (6th Cir. 2005).
204. See, e.g., Russell v. Salve Regina Coll., 890 F.2d 484,499 (1st Cir. 1989).
205. See supra Parts III.A-E.
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